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Abstract
Debate as regards the relation between democracy and information has been dominated by 
the concept of public sphere, one that has presupposed over recent decades state subsidy of 
information and communication resources. In contrast, this article reviews criticisms 
presented by pro-market analyses of inadequacies of state involvement. It proceeds to 
examine and engage their argument that capitalism is capable of meeting the informational 
needs of people when left to its own devices, especially in an era of new media developments. 
Capitalism can even be presented as an information system that is, in key respects, inherently 
democratic. The essay continues to address a further pro-market view, which suggests that 
concern for information in democracies is misplaced. This position contends that capitalism 
is crucial for liberal democracy, but that an information infrastructure - especially one 
subsidized by the state - is not vital for democracy's effective functioning. The policy advice 
of this position is unambiguous: keep the state out of information and communications 
domains.
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Since 2005 or so, I have been working on a book, 
provisionally titled Democratization in the Information 
Age, which I hope to complete over the next three to 
four years. Questions that I am endeavouring to address 
there include: What sort of information is required of a 
healthy democracy? How might one identity and get 
a reliable measure on these variables? What is 
democratization, what are its manifestations, and how 
might it be changing in theory and practice? On what 
basis can and should information be made available for 
citizens and how is it best supplied? Of what consequence 
for democracy is the convergence and integration of 
information and communications technologies? What 
prospects and opportunities for new forms of political 
engagement are coming available in the current ‘post- 
ideological’ epoch…?
This essay expresses only part of my reflections on 
this capacious yet vital subject. My focus here concerns 
chiefly one aspect of what will be a lengthy book. Here 
I shall centre on the relationships between democracy, 
information and, especially, markets. The essay ought 
not to be read as one of advocacy, but primarily as one 
of questioning and critique of others’ thought. Its 
starting point is the observation that, amongst many 
scholars, there is a supposition that the informational 
needs of a democratic society cannot be met adequately 
by the market system and that, because this is so, states 
must intervene to make up for this shortfall. During the 
latter part of the 20th century this way of seeing, what 
might be called amongst Europeans the social 
democratic consensus, seized upon Jürgen Habermas' 
notion of the public sphere to justify government 
involvement and expenditure, arguing that public 
service principles - at odds with market arrangements - 
were essential to the formation of a public sphere and 
thus to the health of democracy (Webster, 2010). This 
argument is orthodox amongst those who argue that 
broadcast television, public libraries, museums and art 
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galleries, education, social and economic statistics and 
the like must be funded from general taxation if 
democracies are to prosper. 
Oddly enough, this melding of the concept of the 
public sphere with public service organizations sets 
aside Habermas’ historical account of the emergence of 
the public sphere in Britain. In his influential book, 
Habermas (1989) argued that capitalism was the pioneer 
of the ‘bourgeois public sphere’ and, moreover, that 
this was as far as the public sphere advanced before the 
spread of monopoly capital in the 20th century brought 
about its denudation. Habermas traced the emergence 
of the public sphere in England through the struggles of 
traders, merchants and entrepreneurs who, being a 
constituency excluded from positions of power in a 
feudalistic and monarchist society, were to the fore of 
creating spaces in which discussion and debate about 
politics could take place. Coffee houses, small magazines, 
literary clubs and newspapers were instances of this 
development. The practical importance of capitalism 
for the formation of the public sphere is underestimated 
by those whose approaches now start from an idealization 
of the public sphere that is regarded as antipathetic to 
the market and expressed in public service institutions 
that are regarded as threatened by commercialization.
Reminding ourselves of the capability of capitalism 
to build a ‘bourgeois public sphere’, this essay sets out 
to reassess the role of the market with regard to 
information and democracy. More specifically, it will 
do three things: 
• It will review the critique presented by pro-market 
analyses of inadequacies of state involvement in 
general and in the informational domain in 
particular.
• It will examine and engage the pro-market argument 
that, while capitalism may not produce a fully 
formed public sphere, it is capable of meeting the 
informational needs of people when left to its own 
devices. Indeed, capitalism can be presented as an 
information system that is, in key respects, 
inherently democratic. 
• It will then discuss another pro-market view that 
suggests concern for information in democracies 
is misplaced. This position contends that capitalism 
is crucial for liberal democracy, but that an 
information infrastructure - especially one subsidized 
by the state - is not vital for democracy’s effective 
functioning.
In brief, this essay will discuss thinkers who are 
opposed to notions of the public sphere where they do 
not find the conception irrelevant. For such as Hayek 
(1899～1992) capitalism allows liberty, a value that 
trumps democracy by virtue of its capacity to provide 
an informational environment that harmonizes individual 
need and productive activity. From this point of view 
endeavours to establish a public sphere other than by 
leaving things to the market are futile if not positively 
damaging. After Hayek we will encounter a leading 
neo-conservative American thinker, Francis Fukuyama, 
who contends that, while capitalism is necessary for 
democracy to flourish, there is no need to waste 
resources on bolstering the latter with information on 
the rates, albeit that the Information Society brings 
about challenges to social order.
Failings of State Intervention
We may start with criticisms from pro-market writers 
that are aimed at proponents of state intervention. 
Crudely, the charge is that state involvement reveals a 
record of failure that is sufficient to warn against it 
being tried ever again. 
Highlighting such failure represents an assault that 
reaches well beyond matters of information, highlighting 
the repeated shortcomings of collectivist measures 
across economic, political and social domains. Whether 
it is the terrors of the Gulag in the 1930s or the horrors 
of Pol Pot’s Cambodia in the 1980s, the failure of the 
Soviet Union (1917～1991) to match the production of 
Western capitalism or to allow democratic participation 
of its peoples, or simply the ineptitude of state-run 
services, market supporters are scathing about the 
capabilities of state intervention. To be sure, they do 
not equate the evils of China’s Cultural Revolution 
with the relatively benign nationalizations of, say, 
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Britain’s post-War Labour Government or François 
Mitterand’s administration of France during the 1980s 
and mid-1990s. At root, however, there is the conviction 
that advocacy of the ‘all knowing state’ will end badly, 
whether this is carried out by ruthless Bolsheviks or by 
well-meaning Fabians blind to the perverse consequences 
of their efforts at reform (Hirschman, 1991).
Pro-market authors do not deny that capitalism also 
has its faults – that there are booms and slumps and 
gross inequalities of reward is freely admitted - , but 
they do insist that the alternative is immeasurably 
worse. This holds true even in the present era when a 
failure of the banking system worldwide late in 2008 
has impelled states to provide such measures of support 
from public funds that much of the previously private 
financial system has been de facto nationalized. 
Nonetheless, even the hapless condition of contemporary 
capitalism appears benign when set against the sorry 
record of collectivism, which has been tested in the 
cauldron of history and found wanting. 
Over the years, capitalism has manifested an 
extraordinary capacity to deliver economic expansion, 
making it far and away the most successful form of 
industrialism (Berger, 1982). One can concede that, 
when it comes to heavy industrial and infrastructural 
projects such as shipbuilding and the construction of 
roads and railways, then state-directed policies once 
could compare favourably with what the market could 
deliver, notably during immediate post-War reconstruction 
(cf. Galbraith, 1967). However, over the last half century 
the inefficiencies and inadequacies of collectivism have 
been laid bare, notably when it comes to supply of 
consumer goods and services. During these ‘golden 
years’ (Hobsbawm, 1994) the market system delivered 
an unprecedented expansion in terms of standards of 
living. Over the trente glorieuses that ran from 1945 to 
1975 television, indoor plumbing, washing machines, 
refrigerators and fashionable clothing came available to 
ordinary people in the West - while their counterparts 
under Communism lagged behind (Wasserstein, 2007). 
Living standards in Western Europe have increased by 
around 300% in real terms over the past half-century 
(Crouch, 1999), far outstripping advances under any 
collectivist system.
The Soviet Union and its satellites eventually collapsed 
around 1990. The failure of these state-dominated regimes 
to shift emphasis away from heavy industry and 
top-down production targets meant that they were 
incapable of adjusting to an era that was globalized, 
commercialized and concerned to meet as well as 
stimulate the desires of people for consumer goods and 
services (Mazower, 1998, ch.11). Fukuyama (1992) 
announced it as climactic, when ‘Marxism-Leninism as 
an economic system met its Waterloo’ because it was 
incapable of meeting ‘the requirements of the 
information age’ (p. 93). This new epoch is connected 
inextricably to accelerated innovation, heightened 
cosmopolitanism and intensified globalization where 
appeals to the preferences of consumers are vital and 
clunky decision-making is inappropriate. Fukuyama’s 
dictum, the ‘victory of the vcr’ (video cassette recorder 
- now pointedly outdated and outperformed by still 
more advanced consumer technologies such as the 
iPhone), encapsulates his argument that capitalism’s 
supremacy comes through the capacity to provide 
consumers with the exciting innovations they need.
Of course, we do need to differentiate between the 
state control of Communist totalitarians and the milder 
forms of state interventions of Social Democracy. 
Perhaps it is better that we conceive here a continuum 
stretching between out-and-out free market capitalism 
and Communist regimes that were (and remain so only 
in enclaves like North Korea) systemic in their hold. In 
the ruck of history, few situations are to be found at the 
extreme edges of this continuum, though precisely 
where people find themselves along this line can be of 
utmost consequence. Nevertheless, at this stage of our 
analysis it is important to acknowledge the criticism of 
those whose regard all endeavours at and towards state 
direction of life as a slippery slope towards ‘the road to 
serfdom’ (Hayek, 1944). As we shall see as this essay 
progresses, the decision to intervene by the state has 
serious implications for how society functions, often in 
ways that are antipathetic to the intentions of those who 
initiated and encouraged state involvement.
Meanwhile, we may stay with the more general 
criticism of collectivism that emanates from pro-market 
thinkers since it allows us to gain a fuller understanding 
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of their position as regards information. These thinkers 
are sceptical of state intervention because they regard 
government interference as a threat to liberty. Such 
intervention, they suggest, frequently begins with 
economic affairs, but it can soon extend thereafter 
deeper into social and political matters, with deleterious 
consequences. 
Pro-market observers do not necessarily celebrate 
the grosser instances of inequality that one finds in 
many capitalist societies. However, they do counsel 
against exclusive concern for inequalities that is 
characteristic of many anti-capitalist thinkers - who 
generally follow expressions of unease about such 
disparities with recommendations that the state acts to 
palliate them. Readers will be familiar with such 
reasoning that identifies, for instance, worrying levels 
of child poverty or limited opportunities for social 
mobility that go hand in hand with low levels of 
income, and then follows such diagnoses with advocacy 
of government schemes to better resource welfare or 
education to rectify the identified disadvantages.
The suggestion from proponents of the market is 
that concern for inequality can become obsessive, 
leading to an under appreciation of freedoms that are of 
inestimable importance to how we live now. For 
instance, freedom of movement, due process in law, 
free speech and assembly, universal suffrage and, more 
generally, the right to do one’s own thing unencumbered 
by officialdom are distinguishing features of life in a 
modern liberal democracy. These are relatively new 
characteristics in historical terms, yet their contribution 
to the quality of day-to-day life ought not to be 
underestimated. 
Enthusiasts for the market are quick to point out 
that excessive concern with economic divisions and 
resultant government actions to overcome these 
inequalities can lead to intrusion on at least some of 
these freedoms. For instance, taxing the wealth of some 
groups of people in order to fund efforts to redistribute 
resources to underprivileged sections, or placing 
restrictions on access to particular schools in pursuit of 
increasing equal opportunities for disadvantaged 
groups, intrude on the rights of others to spend their 
earnings as they personally decide or to send their 
children to schools of their choosing. Bluntly, because 
a concern to eliminate economic inequalities can lead to 
restrictions on the liberties of others, then pro-market 
thinkers often remain unpersuaded by, and quizzical of, 
policies that would have government intervene to 
change things.
There is an echo here of Berlin’s (1969) celebrated 
distinction between positive and negative freedom, 
between those who start from a concern with ‘freedom 
from’ wants such that the state is to be urged to support 
those without shelter, resources and employment, and 
those whose priority is ‘freedom to’ so people may be 
allowed to make their own decisions about how to 
make their way in life uninterrupted by government 
edict. It is not hard to comprehend, at least in terms of 
principle, that there are clashes here between those who 
recommend government intervention and those who 
believe that the state is best serving its citizens when it 
leaves matters alone. It will be no surprise that those 
who embrace the latter edict proclaim that ‘freedom to’ 
is found most prevalent in market societies. 
In addition, those sceptical of state intervention 
aimed at rectifying inequalities point out that many core 
values and aspirations are incommensurate with one 
another. One such is the goal that would have us reduce 
or even eliminate injustices of class differentiation, but 
there are others values and hopes that remain vital 
though they may be incommensurate with the ambition 
to remove barriers of inequality. One thinks, for 
instance, of the value of love of one’s family, loyalty to 
one’s friends or of the freedom to spend one’s money as 
one would wish. Such values, laudable in themselves, 
may well lead to conflict with ideals of equality. Should 
a parent, for example, advantage her children by 
providing an exceptionally supportive and nurturing 
home, or should fidelity to one’s friends lead one to 
help them gain an advantage in the workplace, or 
should a grandparent decide to provide a privileged 
education for a beloved grandchild, then each brings 
potential conflict with a commitment to eliminating 
unequal opportunities in life, though the values they 
express may be widely admired. The fact is that these 
values stand in conflict one with another. 
This incommensurability of values encourages caution 
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amongst those who are wary of state intervention in 
social affairs, especially since the latter so frequently 
stems from prioritization of eliminating inequalities 
over all else. Government action to rectify inequalities 
can in these ways have unintended consequences such 
as reducing the liberties of others. This being so, 
pro-market devotees are generally disposed towards the 
belief that people should be left alone by the state since 
then they are more free to make their own decisions and 
fulfil their own dreams when unhindered by interfering 
governments.1)
Then there is the related criticism of those whose 
identification of shortcomings in the here and now 
leads them to propose untried – if feasible in the 
abstract – solutions under the direction of the state. 
Pro-market thinkers, as with conservatives more 
generally, urge caution before such leaps in the dark. 
Indubitably, there are injustices and imperfections in 
the here and now, as there were in the past, but untried 
plans presented as solutions are perilous and should be 
set against the known historical record of steady 
progress in standards of living, health and widening 
opportunities made within capitalism. What we have 
may be unsatisfactory, runs this objection, but we must 
beware destroying what we lack full knowledge to 
replace (Scruton, 1986).2)
Furthermore, how often have utopian plans, when 
implemented by the state, proven to have unanticipated, 
unintended and unwanted consequences? To the 
forefront of pro-marketers’ attention here have been 
failings of the Welfare State, conceived and introduced 
as a grand scheme whereby citizens would be protected 
and sustained ‘from cradle to the grave’ (Segalman & 
Marsland, 1989). The welfare system has been developed, 
one may recall, because of demonstrable failings of 
capitalism to provide adequate housing and health to 
working class people (until the late 20th century the 
overriding majority of the populace of Britain), because 
markets had proven to be unstable and incapable of 
ensuring the livelihoods of large numbers of citizens, 
and because it had not seemed possible to eradicate 
poverty within a laissez-faire order. Nonetheless, 
decades after the widespread introduction of welfare 
provision, market-oriented thinkers were drawn to 
observe manifest problems such as the persistence of 
poverty and even the Welfare State’s creation of an 
‘underclass’ of welfare dependents, perverse consequences 
of state housing schemes such as resentment of rules 
and regulations and tenants not wishing to occupy 
municipal properties (Saunders, 1990), and the spread 
of officialdom and inefficiencies in the administration 
of state-funded schemes (Murray, 1984, 1989; Douglas, 
1989). As Glazer (1988) glumly declared, state-led 
‘efforts to deal with distress are themselves increasing 
distress’ (p. 5). The market system undoubtedly had its 
problems, but it hard to deny nowadays that state 
involvement has been no panacea and that it has even 
brought renewed difficulties as well as failing to 
overcome entrenched problems. 
The foregoing is somewhat general as well as 
applicable to considerably more than the informational 
domain, so let us illustrate the case. Public libraries are 
found in just about every sizeable habitation in the 
United Kingdom today. Borrowing books and 
associated materials is free to users, as is membership 
of libraries, a privilege taken up by the majority of 
citizens. Public libraries were established for a variety 
of reasons, ranging from the largesse of industrial 
1) This argument was at the heart of Murdoch’s (2008) assault on the BBC in the summer of 2008. In his McTaggart lecture, delivered at the 
Edinburgh International Television Centre, the son and heir to Rupert Murdoch’s corporate interests urged the break-up of the BBC since the state 
subsidy of its services disadvantaged entrepreneurs. Murdoch’s claim was that ‘independence’ of news was essential, but that this was threatened 
by ‘the (state) apparatus of supervision and dependency’, while ‘independence is sustained (only) by true accountability to customers’. It thus 
followed that ‘the only reliable, durable, and perpetual guarantor of independence is profit’. 
2) This is a point made still more forcefully by numerous former Communists. Leszek Kolakowski, the brilliant Polish philosopher whose disillusion 
with Communism came from direct and initially enthusiastic experience, replied to Thompson’s (1973) celebrated ‘Open Letter’, with these words: 
‘the only universal medicine these people (socialists) have for social evil – state ownership of the means of production – is not only perfectly 
compatible with all the disasters of the capitalist world, with exploitation, imperialism, pollution, misery, economic waste, national hatred and 
national oppression, but it adds to them a series of disasters of its own: inefficiency, lack of economic incentives and, above all, the unrestricted role 
of the omnipotent bureaucracy, a concentration of power never known before in human history’ (Kolakowski, 1974, p.9). 
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magnates such as Andrew Carnegie, the pride and 
pretensions of local authorities, to fears about leaving 
the masses untutored and incapable of performing as 
well as competitor nations (Allred, 1972). 
For much of the twentieth century there can be little 
doubt that these institutions, chiefly if not solely 
supported from the public purse, were justified in the 
main on grounds that everyone ought to have a right of 
access to information free at the point of delivery and 
irrespective of the individual’s circumstances. Access 
to information was conceived here as a right of 
everyone, whether for personal enjoyment, education 
or enlightenment. This justification for the library 
network was supported by insistence that information 
was a public good, not something to be regarded as 
subject to the vagaries of market pricing for individual 
purposes, since an informed population made for a 
healthier society and democracy. Those who advocated 
public libraries were particularly keen that poverty 
should not be a reason for the ignorance that inexorably 
followed being shut off from a world of books and 
reading. The premise was that were information left to 
the market, then poorer sectors of society would be 
excluded because they could not afford subscription 
fees. At the same time, it was proposed that by making 
libraries accessible to everyone, then the information 
offered would bring benefits not only to individuals but 
also to the wider society since it would benefit from 
having a readily informed and even learned populace. 
Testimonies to this outlook are readily found, 
whether in the earnest schoolchild doing homework in 
the reading room of the library, the autodidact discovering 
the classics alone, or the fledgling politician coming from 
the wrong side of the tracks and preparing materials to 
advance his standing in debate. Booker Prize-winning 
novelist John Banville, for instance, voices a common 
sentiment when, in 2009, he reminisced that ‘when I 
was growing up in a small town in Ireland in the 1950s, 
the local county library was for me both a haven from 
the bleak realities of the time, and an opening on to a 
wider and richer reality’ (J. Banville, 2009, April 3, p. 
17). The eloquent leader of the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders 
Work-In of the early 1970s, Jimmy Reid, soon to serve 
as Rector of Glasgow University, when asked on 
television where he had received his education, replied 
bluntly ‘Govan Public Library’. And Hoggart (1988), 
one of Britain’s most influential intellectuals of the late 
twentieth century and eventually a university vice-chancellor, 
though he was orphaned young and reared by his 
working class grandparents, reflected that the public 
‘library was a home from home for people like me’, 
adding that ‘a great many people from poor backgrounds 
have paid tribute to the place of public libraries in their 
unofficial education. For many people what the public 
libraries gave was as near as they had come until then to 
a revelation of the possible size and depth and variety of 
life, knowledge and understanding’ (p. 173).
There are fine sentiments in evidence here as well 
as inspiring instances and it is hard to deny that they are 
responses to unsatisfactory circumstances of life. 
Books, and especially reference materials, were once 
prohibitively expensive in relation to earnings and 
therefore out of the reach of most working class 
families3), so public libraries could provide a ready 
solution to this exclusion. However, state involvement 
has not worked out as many of its advocates may have 
envisaged. For a start, public libraries have been 
‘captured’ by the better-off sections of society as well 
as by the professional staff who operate them (Adam 
Smith Institute, 1986). Thus it is the educated middle 
classes who can well afford to buy information from 
their own resources who are the most active users of the 
public library, in effect getting a public subsidy for their 
reading habits from those, chiefly the working class, 
who pay taxes but do not personally use the libraries 
that are funded from the public purse (less than four in 
ten working class adults visited a public library in 
2005-6, compared to more than half of the higher classes 
[Social Trends, 2008, p. 181]). Moreover, library staff 
have benefited disproportionately from the establishment 
of these services, being provided with secure and 
pleasant (if not lavishly remunerated) employment. 
Indeed, the majority of public library revenue is 
expended on staff salaries, with less than 10% of their 
3) Though historian Rose (2000) reminds us of the vital role of the second-hand book trade, from as early as the 1840s onwards, which meant that 
while ‘the high cost of new books and literary periodicals was an obstacle to the working class reader, (it was) not an insurmountable one’ (p. 120).
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budget going on book purchases. Further, public 
libraries are book-lending monopolies, their creation 
having put out of business the subscription libraries 
since, while cheap at a few old pennies per loan (their 
sobriquet was the Tuppenny Library), these could not 
compete with an entirely free lending service. Moreover, 
secure public library staff also determine what will be 
stocked in the absence of market signals from customers, 
so it is their tastes and dispositions, succoured by 
high-level education to at least first degree levels of 
attainment, which prevails when it comes to deciding 
on what will be appropriate reading for the wider 
public. From this perspective one may regard librarians 
as in effect censors of materials that are to be made 
available to readers. 
Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of loans 
from public libraries are accounted for by light fiction 
and biographies. Why, one might ask, does the public 
purse need to support the likes of Agatha Christie, John 
Grisham and Jeremy Clarkson when their books are 
readily available for cheap purchase and their literary 
merit, still more their intellectual and uplifting qualities, 
are at best of minor significance? It is surely hard to 
defend making available pulp literature – fiction and 
non-fiction alike – on the rates in this way. The 
pro-market Adam Smith Institute (1986) put the issue 
pointedly when it observed that ‘while the ambitious 
librarian may like to look on him or herself as part of a 
vital information industry, the bulk of library customers 
use the service as a publicly funded provider of free 
romantic fiction’ (p. 21). This being so, what might be 
the objection to those who request state support for 
other recreational activities such as cinema-going, 
football attendance and bowling watching? 
Such observations raise questions regarding the 
efficacy with which public libraries actually operate 
(Leadbeater, 2003). It follows that a driving force 
behind their establishment and continued state support, 
the appeal to mitigate the inequalities of capitalism in 
the informational domain, seems to have been less than 
fully effective. 
Moreover, a compelling case can be made that the 
market system itself has itself managed to respond 
effectively to the needs of the public by, for instance, 
nurturing the ‘paperback revolution’ that was pioneered 
by Allan Lane at Penguin in the middle of the last 
century and has made books affordable to just about 
anyone with an interest in a given subject. By 2006 
British households were spending much the same 
proportion of their income on books, magazines and 
newspapers as fifty years previously – though only 
around 2% of total budget – yet with that investment 
they got a great deal more reading materials (National 
Statistics, 2008). Again, it has been entrepreneurial 
book stores such as Waterstone’s (established in 1982) 
and Borders (founded in the United States in the early 
1970s and opening in Britain in 1998) that have 
spearheaded moves to make book services more appealing 
to the customer, by attractive price deals, considerate 
display of goods, sensitive design of ambience, comfortable 
seating, and attractive complementary services such as 
tea and coffee as standard. Further, online book services, 
most famously Amazon (founded as recently as 1995) 
but now routinely offered by all major booksellers, 
have developed apace, being capable of bringing almost 
any book – new or used - and associated products to 
customers within a few days since they manifest the 
‘long tail’ of huge stocks that can answer the most 
recondite and specialist query. In addition, Amazon has 
pioneered innovations such as facilities to offer an 
online review of a work, to search inside a book prior to 
purchase and to nudge prospective customers with 
recommendations based on individuated records of 
previous buys. Finally, an ambitious project led by the 
Google corporation to digitize millions of volumes 
from library stocks promises to make available to 
anyone with an internet connection all out-of-copyright 
materials. As this service evolves, so does the concept 
of the ‘virtual library’ become real, and with its emergence 
there comes about the prospect of there being no further 
need for the bricks and mortar (and expensive) library 
of today. Hard-pressed local authorities, long concerned 
about the costs of library services that must be met from 
their restricted budgets, may then be able to divest 
themselves of responsibility altogether and even cash in 
on sales of real estate located in prime sites. 
All told, the public library idea and practice look 
somewhat dim when set alongside these observations. 
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The familiar ‘library silence’, the intimidating ambience, 
the limited and often tatty stock... when set against the 
customer-oriented and customer-sensitive marketers of 
information today the public library soon looks dowdy 
and dated. 
Capitalism as an Information System: 
the case for the market
The foregoing has been concerned chiefly with the 
negative views of pro-market enthusiasts when they 
examine the role of the state. As we have seen, it is not 
difficult to pick holes in the efforts of the state when it 
comes to the record of its interventions in the 
informational (and other) realms of life. In contrast, in 
this section we will examine some of the ideas that stem 
from the writing of Friedrich von Hayek to look more 
closely at a more positive analysis of the relation 
between capitalism and information.
A starting point of this approach is that, while 
markets are imperfect, still they offer the best available 
means of ensuring that people’s needs are satisfactorily 
met. This is argued on at least two grounds. The first is 
that, if not actioned by the market, then decisions as 
regards needs must be taken by those who occupy 
positions wherein which they are capable of deciding 
for others. State agencies are frequently to the fore here, 
where accredited or presumed experts of one sort or 
another decide what others require or will be allowed to 
have. There is a wide range of institutions that 
undertake this in any advanced society like Britain, 
from government ministries to quangos (quasi-autonomous 
non-governmental organisations), of which there are 
currently over five hundred. Their existence presupposes 
that élites or otherwise superior groups are better 
informed about people’s requirements that they are 
themselves. Accordingly, where the market is not 
permitted to operate, various planners, experts or 
distinguished others are left to determine what will be 
made available to the rest of us. Most of us are familiar 
enough with these sorts of situation, for example, 
where credentialised educationalists or medical 
personnel assume the right to tell how and what one’s 
children should be taught or what one ought to eat to 
maximise one’s health. The objection is that these 
people are acting presumptuously, arrogating the right 
to organize the lives of the rest of us. Such actors are 
frequently, but not solely, employees of government 
and they encourage the spread of a ‘nanny state’ in 
which responsibilities for oneself are removed and 
placed in the hands of the allegedly better informed. 
Their presence across many domains leads to the 
domination of most of us by élites of one sort or another 
whether in arts, news reporting, or political affairs. The 
university educated, metropolitan professionals assume 
the right to tell the rest of us what to think and how even 
to live our lives.
There is a related observation to make here. While 
pro-marketers stress that, where market mechanisms 
are not available in order to fulfil people’s needs, then 
state-accredited personnel tend to fill the void, more 
critical accounts contend that corporate employees 
manipulate people’s needs in order to persuade them to 
purchase what their company offers. There is a plethora 
of writing in this mode (e.g. Galbraith, 1958; Packard, 
1957; Ewen, 1976), where ‘mind managers’ such as 
advertisers, copywriters and PR staff are alleged to 
work assiduously to manipulate the public to desire 
things which, without the alluring imagery and 
associations guilefully inserted, people would never 
want. The essence of this argument is that ordinary 
people are actively misinformed about their needs, the 
better to persuade them to consume whatever is being 
put up for sale.
Both these anti-state and anti-corporate positions 
assume a deficit model as regards ordinary people, the 
former that they lack expertise enough to decide for 
themselves, the latter that they are so lacking in 
self-knowledge and scepticism as to be susceptible to 
the blandishments of the advertising industry and its 
associates. On one view people abrogate responsibility 
to experts; in the other they are duped by clever 
manipulators. Both positions also share the view that 
people’s needs cannot be made clear directly by people, 
hence experts must intercede, deciding for them or 
leading them to accept artificially imposed needs. 
There must, in short, be mediators who express and 
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define people’s needs since the latter are incapable of 
doing this for themselves.
An example will help clarify this situation. Take the 
remarkable expansion of the business of toiletries over 
the past twenty years or so. The rise of specialist outlets 
such as the Body Shop and Lush and the more general 
growth of soaps, scents, unguents, nail varnish and 
related cosmetics in department stores may be regarded 
by some as an instance of people – women especially, 
though the more recent rapid growth of toiletries for 
men makes one wary of distinguishing too sharply 
along gender lines – being easily conned by clever 
marketers into yearning for unattainable beauty while 
being made anxious as regards their own bodily 
imperfections and aromas. The rush to toiletries from 
these points of view stems from a combination in 
contemporary society of many advisers on what 
constitutes ‘keeping in shape’ and maintaining ‘good 
health’ and manipulative salespeople eager to persuade 
consumers to buy things their forebears could scarcely 
have imagined worth having such as shower gel, 
anti-aging cream, aroma therapy liquid, tea tree oil and 
eye reviver.
However, a more plausible explanation is that 
customers have bought toiletries extensively, not 
because they were once ignorant of personal hygiene 
and/or misled by marketers, but because they have 
decided that these are products that give them pleasure 
and enjoyment, so much so that they continue to buy 
bath bombs, exfoliants and specialist face washes 
(Obelkevitch, 1994). The success of such companies as 
the Body Shop reflects the ability of founder Anita 
Roddick to respond effectively to the needs and desires 
of her customers and this was manifested in the 
remarkable growth of her company, from a small shop 
in Brighton in 1976 to about 2500 stores in over 60 
countries by the time it was taken over by L’Óreal in 
2006. Lush, established in 1994 and now with some 600 
shops in over 40 nations, followed a similar trajectory 
under the guidance of founder Mark Constantine. To be 
sure, men have lagged in this sphere, and until a 
generation ago deodorants, eau de toilette and after-shave 
balm readily evoked suspicions of effeminacy. Women’s 
refusal to tolerate body odour and sloppy manicures in 
their partners may have encouraged a transformation of 
men’s bathroom practices. However, whatever the 
contribution of gender relationships, what is most 
important to grasp is that the most convincing explanation 
for the boom in toiletries amongst both sexes is that 
buyers felt better about themselves when using them, 
found bath essences, fragrances, body butter and 
massage bars pleasing, and came to place a heightened 
importance on personal care and presentation. In sum, the 
rise and rise of the toiletries business in recent years 
comes down to the operation of enterprising people and 
the market system in which they succeeded. 
This leads on to the second argument in favour of 
the view that markets are the preferred means of 
ascertaining and meeting people’s needs. This has it 
that any one individual’s needs are so complex and 
variegated that it is impossible for any planner, expert 
or even advertiser to identify precisely. However, the 
market system, through its everyday price signals, does 
allow the effective mediation of relations between 
producers and consumers. Hayek (1945) in this way 
conceived the market as an extremely complex yet 
simultaneously sensitive information system that allows 
for individual needs and wants to be calibrated with 
economic activity in ways in which no amount of 
planning, state or otherwise, can possibly match. 
It is an important insight of Hayek that markets are 
as much about information as they are about resources. 
In his terms prices and sales are information flows 
mediating between consumers and producers and they 
are the only satisfactory way in which demand can be 
matched with supply. Reflect for a moment on the 
extraordinary volumes of information that one personally 
generates in one’s everyday life, from buying one’s 
breakfast (cereals? – and which cereals? Pastries? 
Coffee? Tea? Toast?...), getting a newspaper (Which 
one? Where? How often?), organizing lunch and 
dinner, maybe purchasing some music or even some 
toiletries... Looked at this way, particularly in terms of 
the everyday arrangement of one’s day, then Hayek’s 
argument is surely resonant. He even conceives of 
‘things we know but cannot tell’4) to capture the density 
and sophistication of routine transactions undertaken 
by many millions of people during the course of the 
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day. How else but by market signals might one calibrate 
consumer needs and products and services than by this 
self-organising process of catallaxy that enables the 
harmonization and synchronization of many individual 
preferences and allows what Hayek terms ‘spontaneous 
order’ to prevail? The only imaginable alternative – and 
it has been tried á outrance by former Communist 
regimes – is by establishing experts who then intercede 
and organize production on behalf of the people: so 
many types of shirts and shoes deemed necessary, so 
much bread and milk required, so much heating oil and 
coal needed.... Planning from the centre in such ways 
has proven to be ineffective at best and totalitarian at 
worst. It will be clear that the logic of Hayek’s analysis 
is that the state ought to have but a minimal role in 
society, with the market best left to its own devices to 
ensure information flows smoothly through the price 
mechanism.
To clarify: Hayek emphasizes that information 
signals via market exchanges are essential to keep the 
wheels of society turning – to ensure that adequate 
provision is made for assuring service and consumer 
goods. With regard to the supply of information qua 
information, Hayek sticks to the same principle: leave 
arrangements to the price mechanism since this will 
allow the making available of information that people 
want and need as regards things such as media (the 
variable range of specialist periodicals, entertainment, 
news, documentaries, music and so forth) and, indeed, 
of more recondite information such as caters for 
financial and economic interests. In sum, the market 
trumps state direction on every front, a radical insistence 
given the powerful presence amongst informational 
activities of government interference in so many nations, 
notably as regards broadcasting, education and research.
Hayek’s view is that the state cannot possibly know 
everything that people need and should it presume to do 
so it thereby intrudes on liberties. Indeed, in his view 
liberty can only be ensured by the free market since it is 
via the latter’s signalling of ‘dispersed information’ 
(Hayek ,1976, p. 9) that people’s requirements are 
made known and circulated. Here indeed is a radical 
vision of the original ‘information society’: it is one in 
which markets are left unrestrained to operate as 
signalling devices to ensure that people are at once 
maximally free and able to have their needs fulfilled by 
the unrestricted flow of countless transactions that 
allow producer and consumer to rub along together.
Hayek does recognize a role for the state when it 
comes to upholding the rules of conduct in society. 
Because it is impossible to stipulate all the ends that 
individuals might wish for there needs to be a set of 
procedural rules so their infinite variety might be 
accommodated and adjusted to. Were it possible to 
‘agree on ends there’d be no need for moral rules of 
procedure’ because life would be straightforward. 
However, just because individual needs cannot be so 
identified, the state must maintain rules of conduct as 
‘equipment for certain unknown contingencies’ (Hayek 
1976, p. 23). Such a point of view allows Hayek to 
support rules for regulating behaviour so long as these 
provide a framework for competition, hence free 
markets.
There can be no doubt, however, that Hayek (1944) 
has little tolerance of government interventions when it 
begins to talk in terms of ‘what people need’ or ‘how 
justice might be established’. His most renowned book, 
The Road to Serfdom, proclaims that state intervention 
is the thin end of a wedge that ultimately threatens to 
bring totalitarianism. Here, in a tract written during 
years of World War, Hayek depicts Nazi Germany and 
Soviet Russia (the two enemies whose fate decided the 
outcome of the 1939-45 struggle) as but ‘rival socialist 
factions’ (p. 6), both antipathetic to freedom and both 
collectivist through their dedication to ‘central direction’ 
(p. 26) by states which presume to know what society 
needs and which are quite prepared to impose their 
visions on the populace. And it is not just the 
Communist and Fascist states that come in for Hayek’s 
chastisement: he is prepared to attack even mild 
versions of social democracy since an ‘unintended 
consequence’ (p. 9) of their commitment to planning is 
4) Sociology readers with long memories will catch here an echo of the concerns of ethnomethodological writers from the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
These also placed emphasis on the unstated, indexical and always contingent features of social interaction. Of course, they did not cite authors such 
as Hayek. See, for example, Garfinkel (1967) and Cicourel (1967).
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a drift towards totalitarianism.
There is in fact wariness towards democracy itself 
that pervades Hayekian thought. On one level, this 
comes from the conviction that free markets are the 
most appropriate means of maximizing liberty in that 
they best respond to individual needs through the 
unceasing transmission of signals identifying consumer 
wishes. As we have mentioned, insofar as the polity can 
provide a regulatory framework to smooth the operation 
of markets, then it is acceptable. However, it is hard to 
escape the conclusion that Hayek has little but 
suspicion for politics and politicians. His view being 
that markets best express and allow freedom, he 
worries because politicians have a propensity to 
interfere in economic affairs. Modern democratic 
politicians are attracted towards interventionism; they 
presuppose the legitimacy and efficacy of planning, so 
much so that for Hayek (1991) there is ‘an irreconcilable 
conflict between democracy and capitalism’ (p. 385).
There are vital issues here. The usual approach to 
democracy has it that in the political sphere voters 
make known their preferences, by choosing from a 
range of programmes and candidates, and thereafter 
elected officials endeavour to put into practice the 
expressed will of the people. Actual processes are 
complicated and compromised, but the primacy of 
politics in a democratic society is acknowledged in so 
far as this is the arena in which people’s wishes and 
aspirations find expression. However, in Hayek’s 
conception of capitalism as an ‘information system’ we 
encounter a relegation, perhaps even a reversal, of this 
notion that democracy prioritizes politics. In his view 
endeavours to articulate the wishes and wants of people 
in the polity is at once an oversimplification of the 
heterogeneity of individual preferences and, at the 
same time, it encourages politicians to intervene in and 
to attempt to shape affairs in ways they believe 
desirable. This imposition of the will of the politician at 
best is destined to fail and at worst hurtles the society 
down the road towards totalitarian rule. This must be so 
since, insists Hayek (1988), the ‘spontaneous order’ of 
the market system ‘generate(s) and garner(s) greater 
knowledge... than could ever be obtained or utilized in a 
centrally-directed economy’ (p. 7). Set against this, the 
interventions of politicians must appear clumsy and 
insensitive and, as such, they jeopardize the successful 
working of catallaxy, hence threatening liberty. 
In this way, Hayek privileges markets as the most 
preferable means of meeting people’s needs, in the 
process contending that liberty trumps democracy 
insofar as the latter presumes to articulate and act upon 
the will of the populace. Trying to give voice to and act 
upon voters’ expressed will, democratic politics 
perversely oversimplifies people’s needs and threaten 
their ever being met by cack-handed efforts to direct the 
market from the polity. To paraphrase Hayek (1991), if 
Parliament is free to do what it wills, then there is not a 
free people in the land over which Parliament has 
jurisdiction (p. 403).
It scarcely needs saying that Hayek’s position leads 
to antipathy towards conceptions of the public sphere, 
at least once these reach beyond being expressions of 
market activity. He would be especially hostile to those 
public sphere claimants of the 20th century who 
adorned themselves in the rhetoric of public service 
while in receipt of state funds. A Hayekian analysis 
would deem it unavoidable that organizations such as 
public service broadcasters take on characteristics of 
self-serving élites, drawing their members from privileged 
backgrounds in the main, being unsympathetic towards 
capitalism because removed from market disciplines, 
and presenting audiences with what they, the producers, 
determine what is worthwhile, unconstrained in what 
they do because their revenue is secure whatever 
programming they produce. Such are familiar criticisms 
of the BBC that is assured of its finances from the 
returns of an obligatory and hypothecated poll tax on all 
television owners (the license fee that provides the bulk 
of the BBC’s 2007 income of more than £4 billion, double 
that of commercial operator ITV and considerably more 
than the £3.8 billion going to British Sky Broadcasting), 
whose audiences have little or no leverage and whose 
staff is composed disproportionately of metropolitan 
and élite university educated personnel (cf. Tracey, 
1998; Burns, 1977; Born, 2004).
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that to Hayek the 
market is the best form of information exchange. Any 
state-funded organization that sets out to provide a 
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service that claims will inform the public of what it 
needs to know is acting presumptuously and is in 
danger of becoming an imposition on individuals who 
are in better positions to identify themselves what they 
need rather than are state-subsidized institutions. 
Hayek’s perception of an unbridgeable divide 
between the unknowable needs of individuals and the 
all-knowing state it discerns in modern politics is overly 
Manichean. We may acknowledge the particularities of 
individuals and be alert to the dangers of oppressive or 
even heavy-handed government without denying that, 
in many aspects of life, we require social and political 
discussion and decision-making that has constraining 
consequences on individuals but serves the general 
good – one thinks of schooling, transport and even of 
welfare arrangements in this respect. Living within 
agreed – after debate – constraints is, in part at least, 
what it means to belong to a society.
Nevertheless, Hayek does effectively remind us of 
dangers that accompany state interventions in society, 
notably so in the informational domain. It is not hard to 
see risks of individual voices being overlooked or even 
silenced in face of top-down institutions such as 
dominate in broadcasting, education and even in formal 
political organizations. All are commanded by highly 
educated, professionalised élites whose views are 
readily heard and in face of whom the majorities are 
silenced. The ostensible reason for such exclusion is 
that the populace do not possess appropriate expertise: 
the dominating dominate through their accredited 
qualifications, experience and ease of operation in 
these domains.
Commentators on the internet have a good deal to 
say on this matter and here we call attention to the 
recurrence of Hayekian themes encountered amongst 
enthusiasts for blogging, Wikipedia (and wikis more 
generally), Twitter and social network sites such as 
Facebook and MySpace. A key refrain of these 
observations is disintermediation, that is, the capacity 
with these technologies for quite ordinary people to get 
a platform for their views and avenues wherein their 
individual contributions may be consequential. Wikipedia, 
for instance, resonates with Hayekian tones in its 
emphasis on the capabilities of the anonymous many to 
match – and even outdo - the quality of production of 
the accredited expert while it also creates an ongoing, 
never completed or definitive, encyclopaedia that is far 
more inclusive than established competitors (in what 
established compendium could one have a running 
commentary of the post-2003 Iraq invasion and 
occupation, details of the recordings of Leonard Cohen, 
or a biography of Keith Jarrett?). Revealingly, Wikipedia’s 
founder (in 2001), Jimmy Wales, explicitly avows that 
‘Hayek’s work.... is central to my own thinking about 
how to manage the Wikipedia project’ going on to 
stresses that ‘one can’t understand my ideas about 
Wikipedia without understanding Hayek’ (as quoted in 
Mangu-Ward, 2007).
Wikipedia stands against orthodox encyclopaedias 
that are put together by acknowledged experts who 
have generally undergone extensive training and have 
taken years to build a reputation sufficient to gain 
approval to produce definitive statements on a given 
topic. With as effective an outcome (if not beyond 
criticism for occasional lapses), Wikipedia invites 
anyone who feels they have something to contribute to 
the subject to participate, the proviso being that what 
they submit must be open to immediate correction, 
amendment or elaboration by anyone else. This is pure 
Hayek – minimal rules of conduct apply, but only in 
order for individuals to be able to make their individual 
and anonymous contributions more effectively. Aggregated 
individuals can, it appears, generate information as 
reliable and robust as groups of recondite experts. 
Sunstein (2006) takes this wiki principle – and with 
it a Hayekian ‘profound truth’ (p. 17) – to contest the 
primacy, in politics and the wider society, of 
deliberation amongst experts or elected representatives 
as a means to develop the best possible information, 
thereby to arrive at the most persuasive policy decisions. 
Sunstein directly evokes Hayek to claim that groups of 
officials can arrive at poorer decisions than disparate 
individuals, this time to suggest a parallel between the 
free market and wikis in a homage to ‘the wisdom of 
crowds’ (Surowiecki, 2004). When many contributions can 
produce documents and policy by having opportunities to 
correct one another’s efforts without fear or favour, 
then the final product can outmatch even the deliberations 
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of the most distinguished authority. 
It should be noted that Sunstein (2007) distances 
himself from full-blown endorsement of Hayek. In 
particular he refuses to adopt what he takes to be a 
consumerist approach towards information. Consumers 
too readily are self-indulgent, passive and content to 
remain in safe information enclaves. These may be 
contrasted with citizens (Barber, 2007) who are 
engaged and alert, eager to contribute to wider public 
knowledgeability and stimulate disputation using new 
media. As citizens choose to participate in political and 
other affairs and as they adapt new media to facilitate 
their involvement, they might find Hayekians 
approving insofar as they bring disparate opinions and 
details to the market of ideas. One suspects, however, 
that when such activists commence formulating 
policies aimed at changing circumstances, then Hayek 
would withdraw approbation in face of what he would 
interpret as untoward intrusions on liberty.
The Market and Democracy
We have seen that Hayek has little time for those 
who would defend the public sphere as a requisite of 
democracy. He saw in the spontaneously organized 
information system that is capitalism a means of 
securing the liberty that he prized above all else and 
was deeply suspicious of democracy’s propensity to 
interfere in people’s lives. Today’s public sphere, 
heavily financed by the state, is part of the threat as far 
as Hayek could see. 
There is much wrong with Hayek’s account. We 
have mentioned already the risks of consumerism’s 
triumphs, but there is also his determinedly over-abstract 
vision and reluctance to acknowledge fully that the 
market can have profoundly negative effects on 
information availability as well as its quality. Davies 
(2007), for instance, identifies the emergence of 
‘churnalism’, that is reportage characterised by a lack 
of independence and courage, built round PR handouts 
and agency items consequent on the heightening of 
corporate drives towards profitability. Playwright 
Potter (1994) deplored a similar corporate intrusion, 
acidly describing the cancer that was killing him his 
‘Rupert’ to depict his derision for News Corporation 
and its owner, Rupert Murdoch. Such critics point to 
the denuding effects on information of capitalist 
activity, regarding it as likely to weaken public 
knowledgeability. One suspects Hayek would have 
been less condemnatory, insisting that the market 
system was the best guarantor of liberty and, anyway, 
customers’ purchases, freely chosen, are what powers 
the likes of News Corporation (Murdoch, 2008).
However, whatever criticism one might wish to 
make of Hayek’s thinking, he was surely correct to 
challenge the conceit of politicians, collectivists most 
especially, who believe they know best what other 
people need and wish for. By the same token, his 
warnings about the all-knowing state’s threat to liberty 
(and, ultimately, then to democracy itself) are to the 
point (as an early reviewer of The Road to Serfdom, 
George Orwell [1944, p. 143] appreciatively observed). 
This insight has been effectively drawn upon in a good 
deal of comment on new media, notably in the ways in 
which it allows the release of information from below. 
The capacity of internet technologies to allow contributions 
from just about anyone – in Castells’ (2009) terminology, 
its enabling of ‘mass self-communication’ – is surely a 
democratizing impulse insofar as it presents opportunities 
for the formerly excluded many to contribute to 
discussion, debate and the creation of knowledge. 
Some, me included, regard this as a positive development.
We turn now to a pro-market thinker who has a 
good deal to say about democracy and capitalism, though 
he appears unconcerned about public information and 
knowledgeability. He stands unapologetically in favour 
of capitalism, yet he neither aligns with Hayek in the 
latter’s view of the market as an information system nor 
in Hayek’s prioritisation of liberty over democracy. 
Fukuyama (1992) acknowledges that greater freedom 
and equality have accompanied the emergence of a 
‘society built round information’ (p. 4), conceding 
these things as increases in choice, freedom from 
constraints and a decline in hierarchies. They are to be 
embraced, but Fukuyama also expresses concern for a 
less positive development that he dates from the 1960s, 
namely a diminishment of social order and attendant 
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feelings of togetherness, alongside a decline in the 
mutual trust that comes with these.
Fukuyama contends that only market society can 
sustain liberal democracy, though a public sphere is not 
a prerequisite for its operation. His well-known 
argument has it that there is directionality to history in 
that market society, being the most efficient form of 
production, has triumphed over all alternatives. At the 
same time, there has been an accompanying ‘struggle 
for recognition’ amongst citizens that has culminated in 
liberal democracy. The conjoining of democracy and 
capitalism is hereby completed, though Fukuyama 
(1992) sees no sublimating satisfaction since it is only 
during the struggle that people feel most free. Once 
they have ‘create(d) for themselves a stable democratic 
society’, they will have forfeited, in victory, ‘the 
possibility of their ever again being as free and as 
human as in their revolutionary struggle’ (p. 312).
Fukuyama’s suggestion is that at the core of the 
difficulties of an Information Society is the question of 
how might we connect with one another. What binds 
together a society and prevents social ills such as crime, 
broken relationships and increased alienation? Fukuyama 
(1999) suggests that in the Information Society there is 
a malaise springing from ‘unbridled individualism’ (p. 
14). While we undoubtedly have more freedom, ‘social 
capital’ (Putnam, 2000) appears to be on the wane and 
with it respect for authority, commitment to the 
commonweal and a sense of belonging. This is, of 
course, a resonant theme in social thought, one that cuts 
across the political spectrum, that we are moving 
inexorably from communally-oriented ways of life to 
more individualistic modes (Nisbet, 1967). Fukuyama’s 
response is also decidedly conservative, in search of 
re-establishing connectedness between people and to 
this degree at odds with Hayek’s more hard-nosed 
liberalism. What is also striking about Fukuyama is his 
perception that this tendency is exacerbated by the 
spread of the Information Society. 
He identifies several reasons for social breakdown 
in the Information Society. First is the ongoing and 
accelerating pace of change, through automation and 
reorganization, that unsettled and threatens all 
communities. The former mining, cotton and steel 
towns of the North of England, now consigned to the 
‘rustbelt’ and riddled with petty crime, family 
dislocation and high levels of unemployment, were 
once by-words for social solidarity and order. In the 
Information Society the labour that sustained these 
communities has gone and with it their more talented 
members who have moved to find employment in 
information businesses. The second challenge is closely 
related, with the Information Society undermining the 
fixities of place in its emphasis on geographical (and 
virtual) mobility and an attendant transitoriness of 
relationships. Sureties that once accompanied long-term 
living in particular locations, working in a specific 
place over generations, and possessing high levels of 
familiarity with one’s neighbours are weakened, people 
increasingly thrown on to their own devices and 
compelled to trust only to themselves.
Third, the transition to information work demotes 
the contribution of brawn in favour of brain, a prowess 
that promotes women to levels with men, encourages 
the feminisation of the labour force, and leaves many 
men – the poorly educated, the unskilled, the discarded, 
the graceless – in a state of limbo. As it happens, 
Fukuyama believes that women in employment are 
taking on the attributes of their male counterparts, 
hence competitive, self-oriented and calculative, which 
in turn weaken the role traditionally played by women 
in neighbourhoods of mutuality, socialization and care, 
adding thereby to a decline in the resilience of social 
bonds. Fourth, he draws attention to the import of 
women’s control over their bodies, modern contraception 
leading to reproduction becoming a lifestyle option. As 
many as one in five women in the UK over the age of 
forty have chosen never to have children and these 
women come disproportionately from the most 
educated and professionalised, hence relatively high in 
the Information Society hierarchy. 
Deindustrialisation, the declining significance of 
place, the feminisation of employment and child-rearing 
an option of decreasing appeal, together contribute to 
heightened individualism, a weakening of belonging 
and a drop in social capital. Concomitants are increased 
family breakdown, more criminality and associated 
discontents (expressed not least in the appeal to elements 
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of the white working class of neo-fascist political 
parties). It is not so important whether Fukuyama is 
correct in his ascription of responsibility (there seems, 
for example, little evidence to suggest a causal connection 
between women’s labour force participation and any 
growth in crime). What matters more is his argument 
that, while be believes capitalism singularly cultivates 
liberal democracy (itself a contested assertion [Gray, 
2007]), the parallel growth of the Information Society 
brings about social disorder. And while Fukuyama 
suggests that the spread of information intensive work in 
‘flat’ organizations can stimulate a countertendency by 
constructing networks of trust across space amongst 
fellow professionals, his general prognosis is dim.
Conclusion
The thinkers and ideas considered here generally get 
insufficient attention in discussions of democratization. 
They are eclipsed by proponents of the public sphere 
that requires apparently never-ending state support to 
address shortcomings identified with the market system 
when it comes to the information domain. There are 
reasons to be wary of state interventions in life that even 
advocates need to acknowledge. By way of contrast, this 
essay has engaged with those who contend tout court 
that the market works best when left to its own devices. 
Here state intervention, even where it is well intentioned 
and even when aimed at demonstrable imperfections, is 
ineffective, generating problems of its own and even 
making unsatisfactory matters worse. 
Such strictures apply equally to informational issues 
as they do to other expressions of the directive state. 
Thus pro-market thinkers readily decry and warn against 
state provision of television services, internet supply 
and even of public libraries. Friedrich von Hayek, the 
most important and trenchant of these pro-capitalist 
theorists, indubitably resists state meddling, insisting 
that market mechanisms are the superior and more 
sensitive instrument for gauging people’s needs and 
desires. Capitalism is, in effect, an information system 
that ensures the harmonization of supply and demand. 
This being so, it will be readily appreciated how 
hard it is for Hayekians to envisage any circumstances in 
which tax revenues might be committed to institutions 
with a brief to service the informational needs of the 
public. Their very formation and practices would be 
necessarily presumptuous and destined to end badly. 
Indeed, as we have seen, Hayek has doubts about 
modern democracy per se, being suspicious of the 
tendency of modern political parties to create ‘plans’ to 
better ‘manage’ the economy (and much else), thereby 
undermining liberty, his overriding value. Here we are 
a far cry from those who would bolster the public 
sphere by yet more state support. From such market 
enthusiasts there are few concerns about downsides of 
increased commodification of information, the presence 
of monopolies in the arena, the extension of consumerism 
throughout society, or the consequences of differential 
power in a capitalist society to advance particular 
points of view.
Francis Fukuyuma announces capitalism’s singular 
capacity to meld productive efficiency and consumer 
desires with liberal democracy. In this neo-conservative 
analysis informational matters are not noticeably relevant 
to either capitalism or democracy, save that the unfolding 
Information Society contributes generally to a diminution 
of social capital that, in turn, leads to disorder and 
disharmony. Such trends may weaken democratic societies, 
though it appears that Fukuyama regards them as 
unlikely to challenge the hegemony of the capitalism 
and democracy connection. 
I close by emphasizing that this essay ought not to 
be read as offering support for the views of either 
Hayek or Fukuyama, still less as endorsement of their 
variable expression in neo-conservative politics. I write 
as a European Social Democrat, one committed to the 
necessity for state intervention to address shortcomings 
of capitalist activity cross a range of areas, from welfare 
provision, the alleviation of poverty, to the, in my view, 
undeserved and even deplorable influence of media 
moguls such as James and Rupert Murdoch who 
encourage the commodification of information at the 
same time as they use their media to shape dispro-
portionately political life. Nonetheless, it does appear 
to me necessary to acknowledge the shortcomings of 
many statist policies as regards information, just as it is 
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important to recognise challengers and opportunities 
that have accompanied the changed information 
environment of recent years (Castells, 2009). In so 
doing, the import of markets and market mechanisms 
need also to be acknowledged since for far too long 
critics of capitalism have presupposed that state 
provision is the best solution, even a panacea, for 
capitalism’s failings. The desirable future lies, to adopt 
terminology of the late Dahrendorf (1968), between 
market and plan (Nove, 1983). 
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